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The Access of Religious Groups To
Public Fora: Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District
Benjan1in N. Davis
The communists are in, the atheists are in,
the agnostics are in, but religion's out
because we don't Jike their viewpoint. (959
F.2d 381)

Question Being Decided
Whether against the background state law, it
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
made applicable to the States hy the Fourteenth
Amendment, to deny a church access to school premises
to exhibit for public viewing and for assertedly religious
purposes, a film series dealing with family and child
rearing issues faced by parents today. (508 U.S. 386, 387)

Facts of th e Case
October 11 , 1989, Pastor John Steigern:ald of the
Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical Christian church in Center
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Moriches, New York, sent an application for the use of
school facilities to the office of the Center Moriches Union
Free School District (''District"). Pastor Steigetwalcl,
representing Lamb's Chapel ("Church''), wanted to use the
school auditorium one night a week for five consecutive
weeks to show a five-patt film series. The series, entitled
"Turn Your Heart Toward the Home," was done by Dr.
James C. Dobson, a prominent licensed psychologist, bestselling author, and radio commentator 013 S.Ct. 2144).
Upon receipt of the application, the District asked
the Church to provide information about the video. The
Church responded by sending the District a brochure that
described the content of the video series. After reviewing
the brochure, the District replied to the Church in a letter
stating that it was the District's decision to reject the
Church's application because the film series "appear[ed] to
be church related" (736 F.Supp. 1249). The District later
claimed they had the right to deny tbe Church's request
based on the following three issues of law: First, New
York Education Law§ 414 McKinney 1988 and Supp. 1993,
which "authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable
regulations for the use of school property for 10 specified
purposes when the property is not in use for school
purposes ... (tJhe list does not include meetings for
religious purposes " 013 S.Ct. 2143). Second, empO\vered
by the state, the District had the right to make both
District Rule No.7 (''[t]he school premises shall not be used
by any group for religious purposes") and District Rule
No.10 (allows the school premises to be used for "inter
alia, social, civic and recreational" activities). Third, use
of the school facilities for religious purposes would violate

the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment (736
F.Supp. 1250).
On May 16, 1990, the Church brought ~ct~on. for
declarat01y and injunctive relief against the Dtstnct .m the
u.s. District Court E.D. New York. The Church cla1med
that the District had allowed many other groups to use the
school facilities including three groups that had "meetings
and performances with particular religiou~ messages" (736
F.Supp. 1249) and by allowing so many dt,:ferent g~oup:
to use the facilities the District created an open fowm ..
They claimed that to deny them access t~ an ~pen pub:1C
forum based solely on the content of then· messag~ was a
violation of their Free Speech guaranteed by the Ftrst
Amendment.
The "standard" for obtaining a preliminary
injunction in the Second Circuit requi~ecl the Cl:ur~h to
show: "(a) irreparable harm and (b) e1ther (1) likehhood
of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair gr.ound
for litioation and a balance of hardships tipping deetdeclly
toward the party requesting the preliminaty relief'' (852
F.2cl 679). Citing Elrod l '. Burns ( 427 U.S. 347) where the
Supreme Court stated, ''loss of First Amenc~ment Freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injUty," the court agreed. tl:at p~rt
(a) of the standard for obtaining a preliminary lt1JUnctton
was indeed satisfied (736 F.Supp. 1250). To satisfy part
(b) of the standard, the Church would have to pro:e that,
based solely on content and viewpoint, it was demed
access to an obviously open forum. The debate over
whether the school was an open forum became heated
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and complex.
The court held that because N.Y. Educ .Law§ 414
and School District's Rule No. 7 limited access of
organizations to the school t~tcilities, the usage of the
facilities was not an "open forum" but a "limited public
forum.,. A classification of ''limited public forum" allows
the school property to remain non-public except as to
specified uses (852 F.2d 679). With the court of the
opinion that the usage of school facilities was not an open
forum, and consequentJy not subject to the full regulatory
powers of the First Amendment, the Chu rch had little
claim to satisfy part (b) of the standards for obtaining a
preliminaty injunction. The Church's request was denied.
After the Church was denied a preliminary
injunction, they took their case to the Second Circuit Cotut
of Appeals. However, the appeal was soon withdrawn
and the case was returned to the District Court E.D. New
York on the recommendation of the Statf Counsel for the
Second District. The Second District said it wanted to give
the District Court "an opportunity to reconsider its denial
of injunctive relief in light of [Board of Education of the
lVestside Communi~v Schools v. Mergens, (110 S.Ct. 2356
0990))].'' In Me1gens, the Supreme Court ruled that public
secondary education schools must allow student-initiated
Bible Clubs to meet on campus and grant them official
recognition. When the case went back to the District
Court, the Church motioned for summary judgment and
the District cross-motioned for the same (770 F.Supp. 91).
The District Court decided that the new iV!ergens had little
bearing on the Lamb's Chapel case. On July 15, 1991,
under the same "limited public forum" argument the

District Court oranted the District's motion for summaty
judgment and ~onsequently denied the Church's motion
(770 F.Supp. 99).
Less than four months later, on November 4, 1991,
the Church aoain brought action against the District
challenoino the constitutionality of the Districts decision to
refuse the Church's application to use school facilities.
The action was argued in the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit (959 F.2d 381). As would be expected,
many of the same arguments were presented from both
sides. However, in this appeal, there was much more
discussion about the "limited public forum" argument.
In Perry Education Associatio-n u. Perry Local
Educators' As~ociation (460 U.S. 37) the Supreme Court
held that "school facilities may be deemed to be public
forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or
practice' opened those facilities for 'indis~riminate .use by
the general public"' ( 460 U.S. 47). Also, m Cornell us v.
NAACP Leoal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., (473
u.s. 788), ~he c;urt gives three different categories of
publicly owned property and assigns certain regulatoty
powers with regards to the First Amendment to each
categOiy. The first category, "traditional public forum'' or
"open forum, " is the one that we will be m?st concerned
with. All of the regulatory powers of the Ftrst Amendment
apply in this categOiy. The crux o~ the arglll'?ent in the
Second Circuit lies in the different mterpretattons of the
above cited clause from Peny v. Peny.
The Church contended that because the District,
under N.Y.Educ.Law § 414 and District Rule No.lO, had
been allowing such a wide variety of groups to use the
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school facilities- particularly the three with alleged
religious messages-by "policy and practice" the district
had made the use of the facilities an "open forum" and
were therefore subject to all of the regulatory pmvers of
the First Amendment.
The District argued that District Rules, especially
No. 7 & 10, and State laws specifically§ 414 of the N.Y.
Education Law, limiting the usage of the facilities showed
that the school facilities were not open for "indiscriminate
use by the general public" and therefore were not subject
to the same regulatory powers of the First Amendment
that an open forum would have been.
The Appellate Court looked extensively at each of
the three instances where groups with alleged religious
messages were permitted access to school facilities. In
each case the court found a compelling argument showing
that the alleged religious messages in fact were not
religious at all (959 F.2d 387-88). These counter
arguments coupled with the citation of several other
related cases led the court to affirm the decision of the
District Court (959 F.2d 381).
Still determined to be heard, the Church turned to
its last method of recourse, the U.S. Supreme Court.
Petition for certiorari was granted and on Februaty 24,
1993, the case was argued before Rehnquist, C.]., \X'hite,
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas, JJ. Justice White delivered the opinion of
the Court.
In its opinion, the Coutt pointed out many different
facets of the case that could have been grounds for
reversal, but for most of these points the Court went only
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far enough to show the possibili~y of grounds for reversal
and then asserted that, ··we need not rule on [these)
issue[s], however, for even if the courts below were
correct in this respect . .. the judgment below must be
reversec1"(,...08
) us
. · 391- 92) · We now turn to the argument
for reversal given by the Comt.
.
Reoarding "public property that is not a destgnated
public fo;1111 open for indiscriminate public use for
communicative purposes'' (508 U.S. 392) the Cm.trt .stated
· Col'nelius "[c]ontrol over access to a nonpubltc forum
k 'd
.
tn
'
can be based on subject matter and spea er 1 .en~tty so
long as the distinctions drawn are reasona~le m l~ght of
the purpose served by the forum and are uz~upomt
neutrat'( 473 u.s. at 806 [italics added]). Thts meant that
·n order for the Court of Appeals to find the total ban of
~1se of District property for religious purpos~s (School
District Rule No. 7) in adherence with the Ftrst
Amendment, they would have been required to conclude
that the ban was reasonable and 11iewpoint neutral. The
Court's argument was that the Court of Appeals should
have failed to conclude both "reasonableness" and
"viewpoint neutrality."
Given that the Court of Appeals repeatedly made
reference to viewpoint neutrality we can only conclude
that it was conscious of the standards required by
Cornelius. However, on the issue of reasonableness, the
Cou1t pointed out that the Court of Appeal~ ''t~.ne:·ecl nc:t a
word in support of its reasonableness holdmg ()08 U.S.
393). Regarding viewpoint neutrality, the Court of ~
Appeals affirmed the District Court in all respects "(9?9 .· ,
F.2cl 389). The District Court concluded that the Dtstt tct
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ha[cl] not, by policy or practice opened its doors to groups
akin to Lamb's Chapel" and therefore ''the School District's
denial of plaintiffs' application ... [was] viewpoint neutral
and, hence, constitutional" (959 F.2cl 389). In dealing with
the matter of viewpoint neutrality, the Court made the
following crucial observation:
The Court of Appeals thought that the
application of Rule 7 in this case was
viewpoint neutral because it had been, and
would be, applied in the same way to all
uses of school property for religious
purposes. That all religions and all uses for
religious purposes are treated alike under
Rule 7, however, does not answer the
critical question whether it discriminates on
the basis of viewpoint to permit school
property to be used for the presentation of
all views about family issues and child
rearing except those dealing with the subject
matter from a religious standpoint. (508 U.S.
393)
A lecture or film about child rearing or family
values could be permitted under District Rule No. 10. In
fact, there is no reason to believe that the District would
have denied the Church's application if the film had
contained no religious references or messages. Therefore,
the District's denial of the Church's application was invalid
according to the following Supreme Court holding:
[a]lthough a speaker may be excluded from
a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a
topic not encompassed within the purpose

of the forum ... or if he is not a member of
the class of speakers for whose especial
benefit the forum was created . . . , the
government violates the First Amendment
when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on
an otherwise includible subject. ( 473 U.S.
806)
This concludes the Courts' arguments on reasonableness
and viewpoint neutrality.
. Another crucial issue addressed by the Court was
the claim by the District that to allow the Church to u~e
the facilities would violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment (736 F.Supp. 1250). Surprisi?gl~ and.
quite disturbing, the lower courts elected to chsmtss thts .
issue with almost no discussion (959 F.2d 389). The CoULt,
however, die\ not turn a blind eye . The issue was put to
the three part test articulated in Lemon L!. Kurtzman ( 403
U.S. 602). The Court held that "[t]he challenged
oovernmental action (1) has a secular purpose, (2~ does
~ot have the principal or primary effect of advancm~ or
inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an excesstve.
entanglement with religion"(508 U.S. 395). Thus, .allowmg
the Church to use the facilities was not an "estabhshment
of religion. "

Opinions of the Justices
Majority
Rehnquist, C.J., Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, JJ. all joined with Justice White.
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Minority

Although the Court was unanimous in judgment,
there were two additional opinions given, one concurring
only in the judgment and one concurring in part and
concurring in judgement.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment 013 S.Ct.
2149-51). Justice Scalia began his opinion by joining in
the Court's conclusion that the District did violate the
Church's First Amendment free speech rights. He then
stated that although he agreed with the Court, that
allowing the Church to use the District facilities did not
pose a ·'realistic danger'' of a violation of the
Establishment Clause, ·'he could not accept most of the
Courts reasoning in this regard"(ll3 S.Ct. 2149-51).
Justice Scalia continued by using an unexpectedly colorful
allegoty to convey his personal position concerning the
Lemon test (the allegory masterfully illuminates Justice
Scalia's view and is well worth reading). Called by Justice
White, ''J ustice Scalia's evening at the cinema,·· the
alleg01y compares the Lemon test to a "ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried"
013 S.Ct. 2148). The clever allegory goes on for some
time, basically illustrating Justice Scalia's contempt for the
Lemon test. Justice Scalia asserted that the Court invokes
the test only when it suits it and ignores it when it does
not suit it. Justice Scalia ended his opinion by raising a
few more objections to the Courts opinion and stating, "I
will decline to apply Lemon-whether it validates or

25

invalidates the government action in question-and
therefore cannot join the opinion of the Court today"(113
S.Ct. 2150).
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment (113 S.Ct. 2149). In his
opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice S~alia calling
the Court's citation of Lemon l'. Km1zman and tts usage of
the phrase ·'endorsing religion'' "unsettling and
unnecessary." (508 U.S. 395; 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2149)
Positions of Cord and ACLU

Perhaps the easiest way to explain the way that
Cord would have viewed this case would be to say that he
would have seen it exactly the same way Justice Scalia
did. Corel would have been pleased with the final
outcome of the case but he would have been disturbed by
the methods (particularly the Lemon test) that were used
to arrive at the final decision. In fact, in his opinion,
Justice Scalia referred directly to Cord as one of a "long list
of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and
bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of
crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has
produced" (508 U.S. 399).
I am sure that the ACLU would have been very
happy to have seen the Court turn its head ~rom tbe
Lenwn test on this case, as they have done m the past.
(See, e .g., Lynch u. Donnel(y, 465 U.S. 679 (1984) and Lee
u. Weisma~ 112 S.Ct. 2685 (1992)). The ACLU would have
been equally satisfied if the Court had held with the ~ower
courts in saying that the District facilities do not qualify as
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Lemon test. Justice Scalia asserted that the Court invokes
the test only when it suits it and ignores it when it does
not suit it. Justice Scalia ended his opinion by raising a
few more objections to the Courrs opinion and stating, ''I
will decline to apply Lemon-whether it validates or
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invalidates the govemment action in question- and
therefore cannot join the opinion of the Court today"(113
S.Ct. 2150).
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment 013 S.Ct. 2149). In his
opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice S~alia calling
the Court's citation of Lemon u. Kurtzman and tts usage of
the phrase "endorsing religion'' "unsettling and
unnecessaty.'' (508 U.S. 395; 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2149)
Positions of Cord and ACLU

Perhaps the easiest way to explain the way that
Cord would have viewed this case would be to say that he
would have seen it exactly the same way Justice Scalia
did. Cord would have been pleased with the final
outcome of the case but he would have been dismrbed by
the methods (particularly the Lemon test) that were used
to arrive at the final decision. In fact, in his opinion,
Justice Scalia referred directly to Cord as one of a "long list
of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and
bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of
crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has
produced" (508 U.S. 399).
I am sure that the ACLU wou lei have been very
happy to have seen the Court turn its head from the
Lemon test on this case, as they have done in the past.
(See, e .g., L)lnch v. Donnel(y, 465 U.S. 679 0984) and Lee
u. 1Veisma~ 112 S.Ct. 2685 (1992)). The ACLU would have
been equally satisfied if the Court had held with the lower
courts in saying that the District facilities do not qualify as
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an "open forum" (736 F.Supp. 1253). As it is though, I am
sure that they were not pleased to see a religious group
cross the threshold of a public facility.
Impact on the Interpretation of Subsequent Case Law

The following is a list of impacts that Lamb's
Chapel has had and will continue to have on subsequent
case law:
1.
"Lamb's Chapel is important because it
applies the concept of equal access to
ptivate groups, expanding prior decisions
which held that students wishing to engage
in religious speech could not be denied
access to school facilities based upon the
content of their beliefs" (Baker 315).
Previously only students were afforded
access. Widm.a r o. Vincent (454 U.S. 263
(1981)) allowed students at public
universities access to school facilities for
religious uses; Board of Education of the
Westside Conzmunizy Schools z.•. J~ergens (110
S.Ct. 2356 (1990)) afforded the same
privilege to high school students (Marks
1169). Now, Lamb 's Chapel extended the
right to private groups "as long as the
religious group limits its uses to the original
purposes for which the property was
opened" (Hall 879).
2.
Lamb's Chapel established that "government
may not exclude from public debate those

3.

4.

5.

who w ish to present a religious perspective''
(Steffey 25). In Lamb's Chapel "the Supreme
Coutt has taught that the government carries
a heavy burden to justify any content-based
restrictions imposed upon protected
expression. In fact, content based
censorship will be, in all but the most
exceptional ci rcumstances, inevitably
unconstitutional (see Police Deparlnzent u.
1~osle)J 404 U.S. 92 at 95-96 0972))"
.'
(Seklow et. al. 27).
The District's reaction to the Church's
request "illustrates how classifying a
viewpoint or theoty as ·religious' may have
the effect of rnarginalizing it" (Johnson
461). This more clearly exposes one form of
anti-religious bigotry and gives protectors of
religious freedoms a more concrete :ie':" of
one of the presently occurring constltlltlonal
violations that must be guarded against.
"Lamb's Chapel also will help those students
who seek to express their religious views in
the public schools by expanding their rights
beyond the terms of the Equal Access Act
and placing their emphasis instead on the
First Amendment"(see Shunncay v. Albany
Co unO' School District 826 F.Supp. 1320)
(Baker 324).
For reference in future cases, Lamb's Chapel
"should help to dispel the notion that merely
permitting religious speech is equivalent to
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.'
(Seklow et. al. 27).
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. h
For reference in future cases, La·m b s C ape1
"should help to dispel the notion that merely
permitting religious speech is equivalent to
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6.

7.

8.

establishing an official religion" (325). Also
for future cases, Lambs Chapel shows that
efforts to make viewpoint discrimination
more palatable by using it in conjunction
with the Establishment Clause, a strategy of
the District, will be weakened (Hamilton
1589).
Lambs Chapel is a step toward reestablishing "equal access to the marketplace
of ideas for religious people" (Teepen 5).
After ·'a long trend of judicial bias against
religion that has resulted in a number of
decisions adverse to persons seeking to
express religious viewpoints in the public
schools," in Lamb's Chapel, the Supreme
Court finally took a step in the direction of a
reversal of this ''trend" (Baker 315; see also
Carter 118). With this step, the Court has
shown that it "is willing, at a minimum, to
set aside efforts to make religions suffer
special penalties that secular organizations
do not" (Carter 141).
The following are just a few of the larger
cases that were decided subsequent to
Lanzb's Chapel, based on citations of Lambs
Chapel:
•
Chabad-Lubauitch of Georgia t'.
Jl!fille1'~ No. 92-8008, 1993 \X'L 409604
(llrh Cir. Oct. 18, 1993).
•
Doe v. Small, 964 F.2cl 611 (7111 Cir.
1992).

•

Shwnwav v. Albany Coun~)l School
District, S26 F.Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo.

1993).

•

Verbena United Jl1ethodist Church

l'.

Chilton Coztntv Board ofEducation,
765 F.Supp. 793 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
My Opinion o f the Outcome

In 1963, Justice Goldberg "warned that judicial over
reliance on the principle of religious neutrality could lead
to 'a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular a~d a
passive, or even active, hostility to th~ religi?us"' (qtd. t.n,
Baker 327). The only thing wrong With Justtce Golclbetg s
warning is that by the time he gave it, the hostility h_ad
been well uncle1way for some time, and would contmue
on in that direction for many years to come. However,
with the decision of Lamb's Chapel, and a few other cases
before it (e.g., Nfergens, Widma1), the Supreme Court
made a move toward a desperately needed course
correction.
After many years of general hostility toward
religion (e.g., Employment v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 0990);
Wisconsin u. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 0972); Reynolds l ' . U.S.,
98 U.S. 145 (1879)), the Court made a step toward
affording religion the protections that the framers of the
Constitution meant it to have.
My opinion of the outcome of the trial is almost
exactly the same as the opinion of Justice Scalia: I concur
with the majority except for their assertion of the Lemon
test.
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\X'ith regards to the Lemon test, the creator bas
killed its own creation, the Court alone is responsible for
the devaluation of the test. The test has been
incapacitated by the Coutt's frivolous usage of it discussed
in Justice Scalia's allegory:
When we wish to strike down a practice, it
forbids, we invoke it, see, e.g., Aguilar u.
Felton (473 U.S. 783 (1983)); when we wish
to up hold a practice it forbids, we ignore it
entirely, see Marsh u. Chmnhers ( 463 U.S.
741 (1973)). Sometimes, we take a middle
course, calling its three prongs "no more
than helpful sign posts," Hunt u. McNair
(413 U.S. 741 (1973)). Such a docile and
useful monster is worth keeping around, at
least in a somnolent state; one never knows
when one might need him. (508 U.S. 399)
With that genre of methodology toward the test, how
could the Court have expected the test to hold up?
The greatest damage incurred by the Lenwn test
has been the part it has taken in subtly coaxing modern
jurisprudence to a dangerously false conception of the
Establishment Clause. The misconception occurs when
persons view Lenwn as a way to protect the government,
the constitution, the laws, etc., from religion. As Carter
says in his atticle in the Haruard Law Ret'iew,
"Government power, not religion, is the evil at which the
Establishment Clause is aimed " 031). To this principle,
Seklow, Fournier and Etherieclge add the following:
·'Properly understood, the Establishment Clause is a
limitation on the power of the government. It is not a
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restriction on the rights of individuals acting on their own
behalf according to the dictates of their conscience'' (27).
The District's claim that to allow the Church to use
their facilities would be a violation of the Establishment
Clause is a perfect example of the misconception
discussed above. In the following two paragraphs
Seklow Fournier, and Etherieclge plainly expose the
problet~ with the District's use of the Establishment
Clause:
The Establishment Clause presents no bar to
a policy of equal access to government
facilities. In fact, the Establishment Clause
''equires government neutrality and forbids
government hostility toward religion. Only
a policy of equal access avoids hostility and
preserves neutrality toward religion. Thus,
the Establishment Clause actually ma11dates
equal access to open fora for religious
speakers. Viewpoint-based spe~ch
restrictions are even more egregtous than
content-based discrimination. As such, the
Establishment Clause, which is an
insufficient justification for denying equal
access to religious speakers, could never
justify the type of anti-bigotty exhibited by
Center Moriches. (53)
Surely the "wall of separation between church and state
was coined to describe a protection of religion from
.
oovernment, not the olher way around" (Carter 134).
b
One final note: in his article, "The Resurrection of
Religious Freedom," Carter suggests that religious groups
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.
.
, (?7)
behalf according tob the dictates of thetr
consctence
- ·
The District's claim that to allow the Church to use
their facilities would be a violation of the Establishment
Clause is a perfect example of the misconception
discussed above. In the following two paragraphs
Seklow, Fournier, and Etherieclge plainly ex~ose the
problem with the District's use of the EstabLishment
Clause:
The Establishment Clause presents no bar to
a policy of equal access to government
facilities. In fact, the Establishment Clause
requires government neutrality ~~d forbids
government hostility toward rehgton. Only
a policy of equal access avoid~ l:ostility and
preserves neutrality toward rehg10n. Thus,
the Establishment Clause actually mandates
equal access to open fora for religious
speakers. Viewpoint-based spe~ch
restrictions are even more egregtous than
content-based discrimination. As such, the
Establishment Clause, which is an
insufficient justification for denying equal
access to religious speakers, could never
justify the type of anti-bigotry exhibited by
Center Moriches. (53)
Surely the "wall of separation between ch~u·.ch a_ncl state
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One final note: in his article, "The Resurrectton of
Religious Freedom," Carter suggests that religious groups
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are a vital and unique body within the intermediary
groups that fill the gap between government and citizen.
Among these intermedia ty groups are private clubs,
special interest groups, lobbying groups, etc. The
intermediaty institutions provide different realities and
realms in which their members exist, think, create, and
function independent of the state-controlled realm.
Without these groups a totalitatian government would fill
the gap between government and citizen on its own.
Religious groups are different from the other
intermediaries because they encourage their members to
engage in "contemplation of ultimate questions." The
search for answers to these ultimate questions cultivates
the values and mora ls that are so vital to democracy.
Indeed, it was the vety search for ultimate answers that
lead the founding generation to understand the need for
the protection of religion. This search, and the fruits of it
are paramount to the democratic way of life. To sum up,
Carter said:
religions [must] continue to play their
important historical role as vital transmitters
of values-of meanings-from one
generation to the next. Here again, not all
religious traditions will transmit the same
values, and not all the values transmitted
will be stable and pro-democratic. But in a
nation in which a strong majority of citizens
describe themselves as religious and a strong
majority of the religious say they look to
their religious traditions for moral guidance,
we should celebrate and carefully preserve
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the vital freedom of the religions to supply
their adherents the values that their
traditions deem best. (136-38)
Lamb's Chapel endeavored to use a public forum to
help its community engage in the asking of some ultimate
questions, the search for meanings. When the Supreme
Court said yes to the Church, they took a step toward the
re-cultivation of the seed that was planted and protected
by the Founding Fathers: ·'Religious groups are of special
value to a democracy, and the state should nurture them
rather than reject them" 036).

Works Cited
Baker, Michael D. "Protecting Religious Speakers Access to
Public School Facilities." Case Western Reserve Law
Review 44 (Fall 1993): 315-31.
Carter, Stephen L. "The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?
(The Supreme Court, 1992 Term)." Harvard Law
Review 107 (November 1993): 118-42.
Hall, Timothy K. "Constitutional Conflict: The
Establishment Clause Meets the Free Speech
Clause." Mercer Law Review 45 (Winter 1994): 87580.
Hamilton, John W. ·'Religion-Trained Viewpoints are
Banned From the Marketplace of Ideas."
Washington and Lee Law Review 49 (1992): 155790.
Johnson, Phillip E. "Is God Unconstitutional?'' Colorado
Law Review 66 (Spring 1995): 461-75.
Marks N, Wirt. P. ·The Lemon Test Rears its Ugly Head

32
are a vital and unique body within the intermediary
groups that fill the gap between government and citizen.
Among these intermediaty groups are private clubs,
special interest groups, lobbying groups, etc. The
intermedia1y institutions provide different realities and
realms in which their members exist, think, create, and
function independent of the state-controlled realm.
Without these groups a totalitarian government would fill
the gap between government and citizen on its own.
Religious groups are different from the other
intermediaries because they encourage their members to
engage in "contemplation of ultimate questions." The
search for answers to these ultimate questions cultivates
the values and morals that are so vital to democracy.
Indeed, it was the vety search for ultimate answers that
lead the founding generation to understand the need for
the protection of religion. This search, and the fruits of it
are paramount to the democratic way of life. To sum up ,
Carter said:
religions [must] continue to play their
impottant historical role as vital transmitters
of values-of meanings- from one
generation to the next. Here again, not all
religious traditions will transmit the same
values, and not all the values transmitted
w ill be stable and pro-democratic. But in a
nation in which a strong majority of citizens
describe themselves as religious and a strong
majority of the religious say they look to
their religious traditions for moral guidance,
we should celebrate and carefully preserve

33
the vital freedorn of the religions to supply
their adherents the values that their
traditions deem best. 036-38)
Lamb's Chapel endeavored to use a public forum to
help its conmmnity engage in the asking of some ultimate
questions, the search for meanings. When the Supreme
Court said yes to the Church, they took a step toward the
re-cultivation of the seed that was planted and protected
by the Founding Fathers: ·'Religious groups are of special
value to a democracy, and the state should nurture them
rather than reject them" 036).

Works Cite d
Baker, Michael D. "Protecting Religious Speakers Access to
Public School Facilities." Case Western Reserve Law
Review 44 (Fall 1993): 315-31.
Carter, Stephen L. "The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?
(The Supreme Court, 1992 Term)." Harvard Law
Review 107 (November 1993): 118-42.
Hall, Timothy K. "Constitutional Conflict: The
Establishment Clause Meets the Free Speech
Clause." Mercer Law Review 45 (\Vinter 1994): 87580.
Hamilton John W. "Religion-Trained Viewpoints are
Bdnned From the Marketplace of Ideas."
Washington and Lee Law Review 49 0992): 155790.
Johnson, Phillip E. "Is God Unconstitutional?'' Colorado
Law Review 66 (Spring 1995): 461-75.
Marks N, Wirt. P. ''The LemoJZ Test Rears its Ugly Head

34
Again? (Religion, Morality and the Law
Symposium)." University of Richmond Law Review
27 (\Vinter 1993): 1153-71.
Steffey, MatthewS. "Religious Participation in Public
Debate." Mississippi College Law Review 14 (Fall
1993): 23-6.
Tee pen, Tom. "'Religious Right is Back in Class." Atlanta
Journal and Constitution 5 (June 20, 1993): 1-22.

School Prayer and the Establishment of
Religion: A Look at Engel v. Vitale
Christopher A. Bauer
Introduction
The Founders did not intend for religious practice
to be separate from education. \Vhile drafting the pol icy
that would govern the affairs of the University of Virginia
in 1824, Thomas Jefferson included this requirement: "The
students of the University will be free, and expected to
attend religious worship at the establishment of their
respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their
school in the University at its stated hour" (Corel 135).
Today, there is a rising sentiment in the countty to return
to such aspirations of the Founding Fathers. Julian R.
Kossow, in a recent law review article, summarized this
growing consensus: ''The re ligious right has repeatedly
expressed its desire to make America a 'Christian nation.'
A majority of American citizens now want to return prayer
to public schools" (1).
On June 25, 1962, the Supreme Court delivered its
opinion on Engel u. Vitale, a controversial school prayer
case and the first of its kind (370 U. S. 421; Porter 128).
The majority held that "state officials may not compose an
official state prayer and require that it be recited in the

